The standard workhorse models of monetary policy now commonly in use, both for teaching macroeconomics to students and for supporting policymaking within many central banks, are incapable of incorporating the most widely accepted accounts of how the 2007-9 financial crisis occurred and incapable too of analyzing the actions that monetary policymakers took in response to it. They also offer no point of entry for the frontier research that many economists have subsequently undertaken, especially research revolving around frictions in financial intermediation. This paper suggests a simple model that bridges this gap by distinguishing the interest rate that the central bank sets from the interest rate that matters for the spending decisions of households and firms. One version of this model adds to the canonical "new Keynesian" model a fourth equation representing the spread between these two interest rates. An alternate version replaces this reduced-form expression for the spread with explicit supply and demand equations for privately issued credit obligations. The discussion illustrates the use of both versions of the model for analyzing the kind of breakdown in financial intermediation that triggered the 2007-9 crisis, as well as "unconventional" central bank actions like large-scale asset purchases and forward guidance on the policy interest rate. Further, the origin of these events (as the label suggests) was squarely in the financial sector, and the policy actions that governments in many countries took in response, first during the crisis and then in the post-crisis recovery effort, importantly involved monetary policy. Yet the models of monetary policy now commonly in use, both for teaching students in the field and for supporting policymaking within central banks, are not only incapable of incorporating the most widely accepted accounts of how this episode occurred but incapable too of analyzing the actions that monetary policymakers took. The gap between the models and the world of monetary policymaking is now wider than at any time since the 1930s.
The events triggered by the 2007-9 crisis have proved to be one of the most significant economic phenomena observed among the high-income economies in decades. In many countries the costs of the downturn -costs in terms of reduced production, lost jobs, shrunken investment, and foregone incomes and profits -exceeded that of any previous post-World War II decline. In most of these countries, the recovery from this downturn remained far from complete as of yearend 2012. And, much more so than in most economic fluctuations, not only did financial developments trigger the downturn but once events were in progress it was in the financial sector that this episode especially stood out. The collapse of major financial institutions, the decline in asset values and consequent destruction of paper wealth, the interruption of credit flows, the loss of confidence both in firms and in credit market instruments, and the fear of default by counterparties, were all extraordinary. Above all, the aggressive intervention during the crisis by governments, importantly including central banks, charted new ground both in scale and in scope. In most of the worst-affected countries, the focus of the postcrisis recovery effort has been (and at the time of writing remains) largely on monetary policy.
For economists, however -and especially for macroeconomists, and even more so for those whose interest centers on monetary policy -the consequence of these events has been a crisis of a different kind. The analytical models that have become standard in the field over the last generation are not only incapable of explaining what happened during this unusually significant episode, but unsuited even to incorporating most of the now widely accepted accounts of it. Today's standard macro-models, whether found in undergraduate textbooks or in use in graduate-level macroeconomics instruction, typically include no financial-sector variables other than a short-term interest rate and (perhaps) the quantity of "money," and no way for what happens in the financial arena to affect nonfinancial economic activity other than via the interest rate's role in inter-temporal consumer choice (and perhaps an influence of real money balances, also on consumption). The larger empirical models used by many central banks have more expanded detail, and make explicit a variety of real and nominal rigidities, but still the basic mechanism is the same. 1 Neither offer any way to understand why the failure of a firm like Lehman Brothers, in September 2008, would have had a meaningful effect on the economy, or why it mattered that governments in the United States and elsewhere acted vigorously to prevent other firms from failing. Nor do these models offer any explanation of why or how the unusual actions that central banks took -establishing special lending facilities for banks, purchasing targeted securities like commercial paper and residential mortgages, providing forward guidance on the policy interest rate -would have had any effect. According to the models, once the central bank's policy interest rate reached the practical lower bound of zero, monetary policy simply had no further role to play.
The response to these real-world events on the part of economists engaged with frontier research has presented yet a further challenge, to them as well as to students of the discipline. To their credit, macroeconomists and others have reacted to the crisis with a profusion of new research efforts exploring the workings of financial intermediation and asset holding, and investigating in particular the implications of a variety of "frictions" that intermediation inherently entails under conditions that obtain in any even moderately advanced economy. 2 But there is no point of contact between most of this work and the standard workhorse models. This gap in turn creates two parallel problems: Students seeking to understand how one or another strand of this new research fits into the canonical macroeconomic framework they are learning see an unbridged chasm between two seemingly incompatible lines of thinking about what is clearly the same set of behavioral phenomena. And, in contrast to earlier eras in the development of macroeconomics (see Harry Johnson's (1971) insightful essay), researchers seeking to establish the motivation for their work, among more than a narrow audience of fellow specialists, are able to appeal to what everyone has read in the newspapers but not to what the field holds out as the accepted conceptual overview.
One ready example of this divide is the behavior of central bank balance sheets, both during and in the aftermath of the crisis. As Table 1 Moreover, this radical departure in central bank asset holding was not just a matter of total quantity; the character of the assets these central banks held changed abruptly as well.
Traditionally, most of the assets that central banks hold have been obligations of their own governments, and within those, mostly short-term obligations. As Figure 1 shows for the case of do not fit within the currently standard canonical models -asset purchases and forward guidance on the policy interest rate -to illustrate the workings of the model. Section 3 briefly concludes.
A Four-Equation Model
The most familiar workhorse of monetary-policy macroeconomics today is the threeequation "new Keynesian" model consisting of an aggregate demand equation representing consumers' forward-looking inter-temporal choice for a given interest rate, a "Phillips curve"
representing the forward-looking behavior of price setters operating under some form of impediment to perfect price flexibility (most typically, as motivated by Calvo (1983) ), and an equation representing the central bank's setting of a short-term nominal interest rate in response to observed movements of prices or output or both. 3 The problem with this model, for current purposes, is not so much that it is wrong but that it is incomplete. Once the central bank's policy interest rate has reached the zero lower bound, the model implicitly portrays monetary policy as impotent to undertake any further economic stimulus. It leaves no room even to consider the kinds of additional measures that many central banks undertook during and in the aftermath of the 2007-9 crisis.
The remedy, therefore, is not to discard this otherwise useful framework but to expand it -while nonetheless preserving, in so far as possible, its analytical advantages in terms of parsimony and compactness. The model's crucial lacuna, for purposes of representing the actions of central banks during this recent period and their effect on the nonfinancial economy, is the absence of any distinction between the interest rate that the central bank sets -in conventional vocabulary, the "policy interest rate" -and the interest rates at which households and firms regularly borrow and lend, and that therefore matter for their spending decisions, either as direct costs (if they are borrowers/investors) or as opportunity costs (if they are lenders/savers). The simple model suggested here fills that gap: in this section, with a single reduced-form equation directly determining the spread between the policy interest rate and a representative private-sector interest rate; and then, in Section 2, with a two-equation supplydemand apparatus explicitly representing lenders' and borrowers' behavior in the market for private-sector obligations.
Two elements of the standard "new Keynesian" model suffice with no change. Price setters behave according to
where π is the rate of change of the economy's aggregate price level for goods and services, y is (the log of) aggregate output of goods and services, u is a disturbance term, and the equation may also include an intercept (not shown) so that y is implicitly measured around some equilibrium level that depends on the economy's resources and technology. And the central bank sets the policy interest rate according to r t = r* + γ 1 (y t -y*) + γ 2 (π t -π*)
subject to r ≥ 0, where r is a short-term nominal interest rate over which the central bank has control, 4 y* is the central bank's target level of output (presumably the level that would deliver stable inflation in (1), although for purposes here this need not matter), π* is its target rate of inflation, and r* is the equilibrium value of r for given π*. Equation (1) is the consequence of dynamic optimization by price setters under any of a variety of well known conditions involving imperfect price flexibility (see again the examples in fn. 3), and (2) may be either the outcome of an explicit optimization by the central bank, given a quadratic objective (so that the resulting decision rule is linear), or merely a convenient rule of thumb that policymakers apply.
The third element of the standard model is necessary as well, although with an important change:
where ρ is the nominal interest rate relevant to private-sector spending decisions, E(π t+ )
indicates the appropriately averaged expectation of inflation over the horizon corresponding to the maturity for which ρ represents the private-sector interest rate, and v is a disturbance term.
Here too the equation may also include an intercept (not shown), so that both y and the expected real interest rate are implicitly measured around their respective equilibrium levels. Although many expositions of the standard model label the equation analogous to (3) an "IS curve" (see, for example, Clarida et al. (1999) ), in its most common form the model includes neither firms nor investment and so the equation is not properly a Keynesian IS curve but simply the Euler equation for consumption that follows from households' inter-temporal utility maximization.
(The equation also often includes a term for government absorption of output, but the focus here is on monetary policy, not fiscal policy.) The broader interpretation as a genuine IS curve fits as well, however, in that most familiar accounts of firms' investment spending likewise imply a negative elasticity with respect to the expected real interest rate, or cost of capital (although it is less obvious that a suitable representation of investment behavior grounded in microeconomic optimization would fit this simple functional form). But regardless of whether (3) represents the behavior of households' consumption or firms' investment or both, the important point is that the nominal interest rate that matters for these decisions is not the policy interest rate that the central bank sets but instead some private-sector rate -ρ -that they would pay on borrowing to finance spending in excess of current income, or that they would earn on unspent income or other accumulated assets.
Distinguishing between these two interest rates means abandoning the assumption, which has been commonplace in standard macroeconomic theory ever since the inception of the field, that all non-money assets are perfect substitutes. 5 Most central banks normally conduct monetary policy by setting an overnight interest rate, or if not overnight then for some other very short maturity: in the United States the federal funds rate (usually overnight transactions), in
Europe the "EONIA" Euro overnight interest average, and in Japan the uncollateralized call loan rate (also mostly one-day loans). By contrast, the obligations that either households or firms issue to finance their spending, and likewise the instruments in which households invest their savings, are typically of much longer maturity, often measured in years rather than days.
Further, while the interest rates that central banks set for purposes of monetary policy are mostly for obligations that are implicitly guaranteed -often claims on banks' holdings of reserves at the central bank itself -private-sector obligations are potentially subject to default. On grounds of both maturity and default risk, therefore, the obligations respectively underlying the policy interest rate r and the constellation of private-sector rates that ρ represents are not perfect substitutes when investors are risk averse. Moreover, the difference, or spread, between the two interest rates can vary over time even if investors' risk aversion is constant.
With the central bank setting r as in (2), but households and firms making spending decisions based on ρ as in (3), it therefore remains to remains to determine ρ for given r. A simple reduced-form relation between the two interest rates that takes into account both the default risk on private obligations and also their longer maturity is
where r e t+ is the policy interest rate that market participants expect to prevail on average in the future over the time horizon corresponding to the private security's maturity, δ (0 ≤ δ < 1) is a parameter that reflects the maturity of the private security (δ = 0 when it is identical to the maturity corresponding to the policy interest rate), R/A is the ratio of risky to total assets that private-sector investors must hold for the asset market to clear, and z is a disturbance term. The first pair of terms on the right-hand side reflect the pricing of long-relative to short-term assets according to the familiar expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates; writing the expected future level of the policy interest rate as r e t+ instead of E(r t+ ) makes explicit that under circumstances like forward guidance provided by the central bank, investors' expectations of future central bank actions need not be "rational" in the conventional sense of consistency with the mathematical expectation delivered by the model itself. 6 The third term reflects the dependence of the market price of risk on the relative supply of risky versus risk-free assets that the market must hold; for given variance associated with the risky asset's expected return, and given risk aversion of investors, the greater is the supply of risky assets in the total market portfolio the larger will be the market-clearing excess return on risky over risk-free assets. For purposes of thinking about monetary policy during and in the wake of the 2007-9 crisis, however, the policy interest rate was already at the zero lower bound and so further cuts
were not an option that policymakers faced. Many central banks therefore turned to (often very large-scale) purchases of private-sector assets. In terms of equation (4), their doing so reduced R, the supply of potentially defaultable and also longer-term assets that the market needed to hold, without changing A, the total supply of risky plus risk-free assets in the market portfolio.
These asset purchases therefore reduced the relative supply ratio R/A, and hence narrowed the spread between the (risk-free) policy interest rate r and the (risky) private-sector interest rate ρ.
In terms of a richer model that would explicitly represent a multiplicity of different risky assets (that is, assets that are not perfect substitutes either for the risk-free asset or for one another) and in which R and ρ would therefore expand to a vectors of quantities and interest rates describing these distinct risky assets, specifically targeted purchases of a security like commercial paper or mortgages would reduce the individual asset supply quantity to be held by private-sector investors R i , and thereby lower the corresponding market-clearing interest rate ρ i .
As the two panels of Figure 4 suggest, and as detailed empirical studies have shown, 9 the Federal
Reserve's purchases of commercial paper (at the peak, $385 billion) and then mortgages (at the peak, $1.1 trillion) -see again Figure 1 -had just this effect. Similarly, a program like the Federal Reserve's "Operation Twist," which involved buying longer-term Treasury securities and either selling shorter-term Treasuries outright or simply allowing them to mature without replacing them, would reduce R i and therefore lower ρ i corresponding to the long-term securities while increasing R i and raising ρ i corresponding to the shorter maturities (if the shorter-term rates are not infra-marginally constrained at zero). will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6 ½ percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee's 2-percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored."
One way to view such a statement is as a publicly disclosed decision rule partially overriding the interest rate setting rule in equation (2). An alternative interpretation is that, in the context of the same interest rate setting rule as before, policymakers were revealing their expectation that under the stated conditions y and π would be low enough, relative to y* and π*, that the value of r given by (2) would remain at or below the zero lower bound. Either way, the relevant implication for the economy -as long as participants in the securities market take the statement to be credible -is as an influence on r e t+ in (4) . Figure 6 shows that the effect of such credible forward guidance is analogous to the effect of central bank asset purchases as illustrated in Figure 5 . Here again the broken horizontal line labeled "ρ" represents the level of the privatesector interest rate following an adverse shock to private intermediation (z > 0), with r, r guidance -which, like its actual setting of r, is restricted by the zero lower bound -is insufficient to restore y to y*; once again, instead of returning all the way to point A, the intersection moves only from B to C.
A Five-Equation Model
The key addition in the model laid out in Section 1, compared to today's standard workhorse model, is the interest rate spread relationship (4) . In contrast to equations (1) and (3), however, (4) In an expansion of the spread relationship (4) that makes explicit the roles of the agents on the two sides of this market, households and firms borrow according to
where c S is the supply of private-sector obligations, and z S is a disturbance term.
Correspondingly, private-sector investors -who likewise include households and firms within the economy, 10 but perhaps also financial intermediaries as well as foreign investors -lend to households and firms according to
where c D is the demand for private sector obligations, and z D is a disturbance term. Supply equation (4 S ) is the adjunct of (3) in a setting in which households maximizing inter-temporal utility of consumption and firms deciding on investment spending are not constrained by their current income and accumulated assets but also have the ability to borrow at nominal interest rate ρ. The first term reflects the greater willingness to borrow when expected future income is higher, while the second term reflects the negative influence of the relevant real interest rate on optimal borrowing, all else equal. Demand equation ( Finally, if the policy interest rate is not already at the zero lower bound, the central bank can achieve the same downward movement of the demand curve shown in Figure 8 by cutting r, rather than resorting to forward guidance to reduce r e t+ . But the chief purpose of the model developed here is to facilitate analysis of the "unconventional" monetary policy actions that central banks took when -and because -reducing the policy interest rate was not an available option.
In Conclusion
The practice of monetary policy, as carried out by the central banks of the advanced industrialized economies, has changed since the 2007-9 financial crisis. The analysis of monetary policy needs to change as well. Monetary policy is no longer merely a matter of the central bank's setting some short-term nominal interest rate. Once they had cut their policy interest rates to the effective lower bound, during and in the aftermath of the crisis, many central banks pursued further measures like targeted asset purchases and forward guidance on the policy rate itself, in both cases intended to reduce longer-term interest rates for private-sector borrowers and thereby stimulate nonfinancial economic activity. The analysis of monetary policy needs to be able to accommodate these monetary policy actions too. It is no longer sufficient to represent the central bank as having a single policy tool at its disposal.
The point is a fundamental one, in two ways. First, for decades the common theoretical understanding has been that monetary policy has only one independent "instrument" (in Tinbergen's (1952) vocabulary) at its disposal: it can set the quantity of its outstanding liabilities, or it can set their market price -that is, the interest rate at which they are exchanged -but it cannot independently set both. In modern times, with brief exceptions, most central banks have Numerous researchers have been actively engaged in seeking to understand, and where possible to quantify, the working of monetary policy within this new and very different theoretical framework. The necessarily simplified conceptual framework that macroeconomists teach to students of the subject -and to which they turn in their own short-hand intuitive thinking -should incorporate this changed monetary policy landscape as well. The simple model set forth here, in either its four-or five-equation form, provides a way of doing so. 10 Here it is even more apparent that with private-sector borrowing and lending what results cannot be a representative-agent model. 11 The linearity with respect to expected excess returns again follows under conditions of constant relative risk aversion and normally distributed returns; substitutability coefficient θ 2 in (4 D ) is then directly proportional to investors' total wealth (A in the corresponding reduced-form expression in the four-equation model), and inversely proportional to the coefficient of relative risk aversion and to the variance associated with the risky asset's return. See again Friedman and Roley (1987) . 12 For given initial quantities of private-sector obligations outstanding, and a given amount held by the central bank, c S , c D and c CB can be equivalently interpreted as either flows or stocks. The market-clearing condition (4 MC ) makes clear that the model developed here abstracts from credit rationing; see again fn. 8. 13 It is also possible to suggest ways in which a reduced value of borrowers' collateral would depress c S -that is, would reduce the demand to borrow even if there were no change in lenders' willingness to lend to them at a given interest rate. But the effect on c D is more straightforward, and it is what the literature analyzing the 2007-9 crisis has mostly emphasized.
14 One prominent exception before the 2007-9 crisis was the U.S. Federal Reserve's experiment with a nonborrowed reserves operating procedure during 1979-82.
